



txOne™
networks

The Leader of OT Zero Trust

現代攻擊者免殺心法

以時間鉗型戰術打穿即時防護

@CYBERSEC 2022

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Who Am I



Sheng-Hao Ma

Threat Researcher
PSIRT and Threat Research

- Spoke at Black Hat USA, DEFCON, HITB, VXCON, HITCON, ROOTCON, and CYBERSEC etc
- Instructor of CCoE Taiwan, Ministry of National Defense, Ministry of Education, and etc
- The author of the popular security book "Windows APT Warfare: The Definitive Guide for Malware Researchers"

Outline

- **Modern AV/EDR Real-Time Scan**
 - Minifiler based Scan Design
 - AV Scanners Challenges
- **The birth of a Process: Malware Loader**
- **Cases Study in the Wild**
 - Black Hat 2017 - Doppelganging
 - Process Herpaderping
 - Process Ghosting
 - Process ReImaging
- **Conclusion**

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Scan in “Real-Time”?

PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutineEx function (ntddk.h)

04/30/2018 • 2 minutes to read

The `PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutineEx` routine registers or removes a callback routine that notifies the caller **when a process is created or exits**.

Syntax

C++

Copy

```
NTSTATUS PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutineEx(  
    PCREATE_PROCESS_NOTIFY_ROUTINE_EX NotifyRoutine,  
    BOOLEAN Remove  
);
```

- Microsoft provides a set of APIs for security vendors, to monitor:
 - `PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutineEx`
 - `PsSetCreateThreadNotifyRoutineEx`
- It's in Kernel, hard to unhook
- Sure, Bad for attackers :(

File Execution Timeline



Where to intercept for AV/EDR?

a. Minifilter File open/create

b. Minifilter IRP_MJ_ACQUIRE_FOR_SECTION_SYNCHRONIZATION

c. Process create notify routine (executables only)

AV Scanners Challenges



- How to open the file for scanning?
 - From User mode / Kernel
 - By File name/ File ID / using existing file object
- Rescan on each change is not practical
- Scan file before the execution
 - File content be altered before execution begins

AV Scanners: Process Notification

```
typedef struct _PS_CREATE_NOTIFY_INFO {
    SIZE_T          Size;
    union {
        ULONG Flags;
        struct {
            ULONG FileFopenNameAvailable : 1;
            ULONG IsSubsystemProcess : 1;
            ULONG Reserved : 30;
        };
    };
    HANDLE          ParentProcessId;
    CLIENT_ID       CreatingThreadId;
    struct _FILE_OBJECT *FileObject;
    PCUNICODE_STRING ImageFileName;
    PCUNICODE_STRING CommandLine;
    NTSTATUS        CreationStatus;
};
```

- PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutineEx() available since Vista+
 - Can be achieved in other ways – SSDT (XP remember?)
- Available only for main executable
 - Not useful for DLL loading
 - Blind to process hollowing

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Process Loader Evolution

- Main Concepts
 - Load and execute arbitrary code
 - In context of legitimate process
 - None of the suspicious hollowing API calls (for AV/EDR)
 - NtUnmapViewOfSection
 - VirtualProtectEx
 - SetThreadContext
 - AV will not scan at all / AV will scan “clean” files only
 - Will not be discovered by advanced forensics tools

Process Loader Evolution

- Comparing kernel32!CreateProcessW between XP and 10 gives the impression that MS completely changed how processes are created
- A deeper examination shows that Microsoft simply moved most of the code from kernel32 to ntoskrnl (and somehow the function in kernel32 became longer)
- Logically the steps remain mostly the same, at least for our purposes

Process Loader Evolution

Windows XP

- **CreateProcessW**
 - **CreateProcessInternalW**
 - NtOpenFile – Open image file
 - NtCreateSection – Create section from opened image file
 - NtCreateProcessEx – Create process from section
 - PspCreateProcess – Actually create the process
 - ObCreateObject – Create the EPROCESS object
 - Add process to list of processes
 - BasePushProcessParameters – Copy process parameters
 - RtlCreateProcessParameters – Create process parameters
 - NtAllocateVirtualMemory – Allocate memory for process parameters
 - NtWriteVirtualMemory – Copy process parameters to allocated memory
 - NtWriteVirtualMemory – Write address to PEB.ProcessParameters
 - RtlDestroyProcessParameters – Destroy process parameters
 - BaseCreateStack – Create Stack for process
 - NtCreateThread – Create main thread
 - NtResumeThread – Resume main thread

Kernel

Windows Vista+


- **CreateProcessW**
 - **CreateProcessInternalW**
 - BaseCreateProcessParameters - Create process parameters
 - RtlCreateProcessParametersEx - Create process parameters
 - NtCreateUserProcess - Create process from file
 - PspBuildCreateProcessContext – Build create process context
 - IoCreateFileEx – Open image file
 - MmCreateSpecialImageSection – Create section from image file
 - PspCaptureProcessParams – Copy process parameters from user mode
 - PspAllocateProcess - Create process from section
 - ObCreateObject – Create EPROCESS object
 - MmCreatePeb – Create PEB for process
 - PspSetupUserProcessAddressSpace – Allocate and copy process
 - KeStackAttachProcess – Attach to process memory
 - ZwAllocateVirtualMemory – Allocate memory for process parameters
 - PspCopyAndFixupParameters – Copy process parameters to process
 - Memcpy
 - Set PEB.ProcessParameters
 - KiUnstackDetachProcess – Detach from process memory
 - PspAllocateThread – Create thread
 - PspInsetProcess – Insert process to list of processes
 - PspInsertThread – Insert thread to list of threads
 - PspDeleteCreateProcessContext – Delete process create context
 - RtlDestroyProcessParameters – Delete process parameters
 - NtResumeThread – Start main thread

Kernel


Process Loader Evolution

- NtCreateUserProcess used instead of NtCreateProcessEx
- NtCreateProcessEx receives a handle to a section
- NtCreateUserProcess receives a file path
- NtCreateProcessEx still available – used in creation of minimal processes (nt!PsCreateMinimalProcess)
- All the supporting user-mode code is not available post XP
 - We need to implement it ourselves

Abuse of NtCreateProcessEx



Abuse of NtCreateProcessEx




kernel32!CreateProcessInternalW


```
filePtr = fopen( "C:\fishfish.exe" )
```

```
ntdll!ZwCreateProcessEx( section )
```


Using ZwCreateSection, to create the file as an section
That's used for mapping into the process




Abuse of NtCreateProcessEx



path: "C:\fishfish.exe"
cmdline: "fishfish.exe http://30cm.tw"
workDir: "C:\Windows\System32"



Abuse of NtCreateProcessEx



miniCreateProcessEx

<https://github.com/aaaddress1/PROCESS>

```
mimikatz 2.2.0 x64 (oe.eo)

.#####.   mimikatz 2.2.0 (x64) #19041 Aug 10 2021 17:19:53
.## ^ ##.   "A La Vie, A L'Amour" - (oe.eo)
## / \ ##   /*** Benjamin DELPY `gentilkiwi` ( benjamin@gentilkiwi.com )
## \ / ##   > https://blog.gentilkiwi.com/mimikatz
'## v ##'   Vincent LE TOUX           ( vincent.letoux@gmail.com )
'#####'   > https://pingcastle.com / https://mysmartlogon.com ***/

mimikatz #
```

```
C:\Users\aaaddress1\powershell.exe

Windows PowerShell
Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

PS C:\Users\aaaddress1> .\miniCreateProcessEx.exe
C:\Users\aaaddress1\miniCreateProcessEx.exe [exe/to/run] [fake/file/path]

PS C:\Users\aaaddress1> .\miniCreateProcessEx.exe `
>> <#exe/to/run#> "C:\toolchain\mimikatz_64.exe" `
>> <#fake/path#> "C:\windows\explorer.exe"
[v] create section from C:\toolchain\mimikatz_64.exe
[v] locate entry @ c7578
[v] process (00000000000000A0) spawned from section!
[v] setup parameters for PEB ok.
[v] enjoy :)
PS C:\Users\aaaddress1> .
```

miniCreateProcessEx

<https://github.com/aaaddress1/PROCESS>

mimikatz_64.exe:5076 Properties

Threads TCP/IP Security Environment Job Strings
Image Performance Performance Graph GPU Graph

Image File *yeah, got signed by M\$*

Windows Explorer
(Verified) Microsoft Windows

Version: 10.0.17763.1911

Build Time:

Path:
C:\Windows\explorer.exe

Command line:
C:\windows\explorer.exe

Current directory:
C:\Users\aaaddress1\

Autostart Location:
Task Scheduler\CreateExplorerShellUnelevatedTask

Parent: <Non-existent Process>(7616)

Process Explorer - Sysinternals: www.sysinternals.com [EXPLOIT-LAB\aaa...]

File Options View Process Find Users Help

Process	Window Title
explorer.exe	C:\Users\aaaddress1\Desktop\arsenal
powershell.exe	C:\Users\aaaddress1\powershell.exe
procexp.exe	
mimikatz_64.exe	mimikatz 2.2.0 x64 (oe.eo)
conhost.exe	

mimikatz 2.2.0 x64 (oe.eo)


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.#####. mimikatz 2.2.0 (x64) #19041 Aug 10 2021 17:19:53
.## ^ ##. "A La Vie, A L'Amour" - (oe.eo)
## / \ ## /*** Benjamin DELPY `gentilkiwi` ( benjamin@gentilkiwi.com )
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'#####' > https://pingcastle.com / https://mysmartlogon ***
```



Outline



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Doppelgänger



Doppelgänger

```
C:\test>processrefund.exe calc.exe MalExe.exe
[+] Got ntdll.dll at 0x77580000
[+] Got NtCreateSection at 0x00000000775D1750
[+] Created a transaction, handle 0x20
[+] CreateFileTransacted on C:\test\calc.exe, handle 0x24
[+] opened malexe.exe, handle 0x28
[+] malexe size is 0xefa00
[+] allocated 0xefa00 bytes
[+] read malexe.exe to buffer
[+] over wrote C:\test\calc.exe in transcation
[+] created a section with our new malicious C:\test\calc.exe
[+] Got NtCreateProcessEx 0x00000000775D1780
[+] Created our process, handle 0x30
[+] our new process oep is 0x140058f28
[+] Got NtCreateThreadEx 0x00000000775D1D30
[+] Got RtlCreateProcessParametersEx 0x00000000775B92D0
[+] creating Process Parameters at 0x000000000055FAC0
[+] creating memory at process for our paramters 0x00550000
[+] writing our paramters to the process
[+] Got NtQueryInformationProcess 0x00000000775D1440
[+] writing our paramters to the process peb 0x000007FFFFFFD6000
[+] Thread created with handle 34
[+] rolling back the original C:\test\calc.exe
```




Doppelganging

- Black Hat Europe 2017 "Lost in Transaction: Process Doppelganging" by @Tal_Liberman
- Used by Osiris banking Trojan
- Requires privileges to disguise malware as trusted system services at SYSTEM32
- Not works after Windows 10 😞
 - Microsoft: TxF files can not be used for creating a new Section anymore 😊 ~2018

Process Herpaderping



Attacker



dummy.txt



```
filePtr = fopen( "dummy.txt" , "wb")
```

```
WriteFile( filePtr, mimikatz, ... ) # write malware into it
```

```
ntdll!ZwCreateProcessEx( section )
```

```
# create the file as a new process
```

yeah! so mimikatz
landed into the process

Process
(dummy.txt)



PE Header

.text

.data

.idata

.reloc

Process Herpaderping



Attacker



dummy.txt



```
filePtr = fopen( "dummy.txt" , "wb")
```

```
WriteFile( filePtr, mimikatz, ... ) # write malware into it
```

```
ntdll!ZwCreateProcessEx( section )
```

```
# create the file as a new process
```

```
WriteFile( filePtr, "AAAAAA..." )
```

```
# remember that the file is still controled?
```

```
# this makes it look innocent :)
```

yeah! so mimikatz
landed into the process

Process
(dummy.txt)



PE Header

.text

.data

.idata

.reloc

Process Herpaderping



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WriteFile( filePtr, "AAAAAA..." )
```

```
# remember that the file is still controled?
```

```
# this makes it look innocent :)
```

```
ntdll!RtlCreateProcessParametersEx
```

```
ntdll!ZwCreateThreadEx
```

yeah! so mimikatz
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Process
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miniHerpaderping

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```
mimikatz 2.2.0 x64 (oe.eo)


.#####.   mimikatz 2.2.0 (x64) #19041 Aug 10 2021 17:19:53
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## \ / ##   > https://blog.gentilkiwi.com/mimikatz
'## v ##'   Vincent LE TOUX ( vincent.letoux@gmail.com )
'#####'    > https://pingcastle.com / https://mysmartlogon.com ***/

mimikatz # _
```

```
C:\Users\aaaddress1\powershell.exe
Windows PowerShell
Copyright (C) Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.

PS C:\Users\aaaddress1> .\herpaderping.exe
C:\Users\aaaddress1\herpaderping.exe [exe/to/run] [fake/file/path]

PS C:\Users\aaaddress1> .\herpaderping.exe
>> <#exe/to/run#> "C:\toolchain\mimikatz_64.exe"
>> <#fake/path#> "C:\Windows\System32\mspaint.exe"
[v] generate dummy file at C:\Users\aaaddress1\AppData\Roaming\dummy.txt
[v] copy PE data from source to dummy file
[v] locate entry @ c7578
[v] create section from C:\toolchain\mimikatz_64.exe
[v] process (00000000000000AC) spawned from section!
[v] setup parameters for PEB ok.
[v] enjoy :)
PS C:\Users\aaaddress1> _
```




miniHerpaderping

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Parent: <Non-existent Process>(7616)

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File Options View Process Find Users Help

<Filter by name>

Process	Window Title
explorer.exe	C:\Users\aaaddress1\Desktop\arsenal
powershell.exe	C:\Users\aaaddress1\powershell.exe
procexp.exe	
mimikatz_64.exe	mimikatz 2.2.0 x64 (oe.eo)
conhost.exe	

mimikatz 2.2.0 x64 (oe.eo)

```
.#####. mimikatz 2.2.0 (x64) #19041 Aug 10 2021 17:19:53
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'#####' > https://pingcastle.com / https://mysmartlogon ***
```



Process Herpaderping

- Herpaderping by @jxy__s
- Works well on even Windows 11 😊
- ...but Windows Defender also can Detect it 😞
 - the well-known Minifilter
 - provide Defender with the ability to scan written files of NTFS

Process Ghosting



Attacker



dummy.txt

```
filePtr = fopen( "dummy.txt" , "wb")
```

```
FileDispositionInfo.DeleteFile = TRUE
```

```
# using SetFileInformationByHandle,  
# mark it as a temporary (delete-on-close) file.
```

Process Ghosting



Attacker



dummy.txt

```
filePtr = fopen( "dummy.txt" , "wb" )
```


```
FileDispositionInfo.DeleteFile = TRUE
```

```
# using SetFileInformationByHandle,  
# mark it as a temporary (delete-on-close) file.
```

```
WriteFile( filePtr, mimikatz, ... )
```

```
ntdll!ZwCreateProcessEx( section )
```

Process
(dummy.txt)



Process Ghosting



Attacker



~~dummy.txt~~

bye :)
vanish from NTFS

```
filePtr = fopen( "dummy.txt" , "wb" )
```

```
FileDispositionInfo.DeleteFile = TRUE
```

```
# using SetFileInformationByHandle,  
# mark it as a temporary (delete-on-close) file.
```


```
WriteFile( filePtr, mimikatz, ... )
```

```
ntdll!ZwCreateProcessEx( section )
```

```
ntdll!ZwClose( filePtr )
```

```
# it's temporary, right?  
# the file vanish, once got closed
```

Process
(dummy.txt)



Process Ghosting



Attacker



dummy.txt

bye :)
vanish from NTFS

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filePtr = fopen( "dummy.txt" , "wb" )
```

```
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
```
ntdll!ZwClose( filePtr )
```

```
# it's temporary, right?  
# the file vanish, once got closed
```

```
ntdll!RtlCreateProcessParametersEx
```

```
ntdll!ZwCreateThreadEx
```

Process
(dummy.txt)



miniGhosting

<https://github.com/aaaddress1/PROCESS>

The image shows a Windows desktop with two windows. The Task Manager window on the left has a red circle around the taskbar icons for Sysinternals Process Explorer and Windows PowerShell. Below it, the text "name? no, it's fileless :)" is written in red. The Process Explorer window on the right shows a list of processes with "mimikatz 2.2.0 x64 (oe.eo)" selected. Below the Process Explorer window, a terminal window shows the output of the mimikatz process, including the user "Benjamin DELPY `gentilkiwi`" and the command "https://blog.gentilkiwi.com/mimikatz".

Process	Window Title
explorer.exe	Program Manager
procexp.exe	
System Idle Process	mimikatz 2.2.0 x64 (oe.eo)
conhost.exe	

```
.#####. mimikatz 2.2.0 (x64) #19041 Aug 10 2021 17:19:53
.## ^ ##. "A La Vie, A L'Amour" - (oe.eo)
## / \ ## /*** Benjamin DELPY `gentilkiwi` ( benjamin@gentilkiwi.com )
## \ / ## > https://blog.gentilkiwi.com/mimikatz
'## v ##' Vincent LE TOUX ( vincent.letoux@gmail.com )
'#####' > https://pingcastle.com / https://mysmartlogon.com ***/

mimikatz #
```



Process Ghosting

- Process Ghosting by Gabriel Landau
- Works well on even Windows 11 😊
- Windows Defender cannot Detect it 😊
 - the well-known Minifilter
 - provide Defender with the ability to scan written files of NTFS
 - But not allowed to scan deleted files of Processes 😊

Process Reimaging

Antivirus Scanner Detection Points

When an Antivirus scanner is active on a system, it will protect against infection by detecting running code which contains malicious content, and by detecting a malicious file at write time or load time.

The actual sequence for loading an image is as follows:

- FileCreate – the file is opened to be able to be mapped into memory.
- Section Create – the file is mapped into memory.
- Cleanup – the file handle is closed, leaving a kernel object which is used for PAGING_IO.
- ImageLoad – the file is loaded.
- CloseFile – the file is closed.

If the Antivirus scanner is active at the point of load, it can use any one of the above steps (1,2 and 4) to protect the operating system against malicious code. If the virus scanner is not active when the image is loaded, or it does not contain definitions for the loaded file, it can query the operating system for information about which files make up the process and scan those files. Process Reimaging is a mechanism which circumvents virus scanning at step 4, or when the virus scanner either misses the launch of a process or has inadequate virus definitions at the point of loading.


Process Reimaging

There is currently no documented method to securely identify the underlying file associated with a running process on windows.

This is due to Windows' inability to retrieve the correct image filepath from the NTDLL APIs. This can be shown to evade Defender (MpMsEng.exe/MpEngine.dll) where the file being executed is a "Potentially Unwanted Program" such as mimikatz.exe. If Defender is enabled during the launch of mimikatz, it detects at phase 1 or 2 correctly. If Defender is not enabled, or if the launched program is not recognized by its current signature files, then the file is allowed to launch. Once Defender is enabled, or the signatures are updated to include detection, then Defender uses K32GetProcessImageFileName to identify the underlying file. If the process has been created using our Process Reimaging technique, then the running malware is no longer detected. Therefore, any security service auditing running programs will fail to identify the files associated with the running process.

Process Reimaging by Eoin Carroll (McAfee)

Process Reimaging



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- **The birth of a Process: Malware Loader**
- **Cases Study in the Wild**
 - Black Hat 2017 - Doppelganging
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 - Process ReImaging
- **Conclusion**

Conclusion

- **For Security Vendors**
 - Do not consider only program files/paths as primary detection features
 - Only processes have attack behaviors & should scan the process memory
- **For Users**
 - Select solutions with active protection
 - Not only Real-Time Protection
 - Zero-Trusted based, EDR, MDR, and XDR



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